Publications

Ascencio, Sergio J. Forthcoming. "Nomination Rules and the Calculus of Mobilization: Theory and Evidence from Mexico." Electoral Studies.
[Open Access Article]

​Does party organization shape candidates' electoral mobilization efforts? I develop a novel theoretical account linking candidate selection rules to electoral mobilization. Nomination rules that require aspiring candidates to compete in electoral races, such as primaries, create incentives for them to make considerable investments in order to win the party's nomination. Using a decision-theoretic model, I show how these initial investments at the nomination's stage shape the candidates' mobilization expenditures in the general election. The main theoretical result establishes that primaries increase candidates' mobilization efforts only when the general election is not expected to be competitive; when a close race is expected, candidates mobilize at the same rates regardless of how they were nominated. Analysis of an original dataset on candidate selection and electoral mobilization in Mexico provides strong support for the theory.

Ascencio, Sergio J. Forthcoming. "Retaining Political Talent: A Candidate-Centered Theory of Primary Adoption." American Journal of Political Science.
[Open Access Article]

Why do party leaders constrain their own power and allow the use of primary elections? I develop a model of intraparty politics and electoral competition in which an ambitious office-seeker reevaluates their party affiliation after their party chooses a nomination rule. The model shows that in settings in which the linkages between politicians and parties are weak, party leaders adopt primaries in order to keep potential defectors from pursuing their individual ambitions outside of the party. The main theoretical result shows that only parties that are electorally strong ex ante can use primaries as a strategy to hold their parties together. Thus, in contrast to an extensive literature linking the use of primaries to electorally weak parties, this model posits the existence of a positive relationship between the use of primaries and a party's electoral strength. Analysis of legislative and gubernatorial nominations in Mexico provides strong support for the model's expectations.

Ascencio, Sergio J.  2021. "Party Influence in Presidential Primaries: Evidence from Mexico." Party Politics 27(6): 1229-1242.
[Pre-print]

Over recent decades, an increasing number of presidential candidates across the world have been nominated in primary elections. Yet, our understanding of presidential primaries outside of the U.S. remains very limited. This paper advances a theoretical argument linking presidential primary outcomes to the strategic behavior of subnational party elites, particularly those with the resources to mobilize primary voters in their regions. I provide support for this claim using an original dataset from the 2012 presidential primary of the Mexican Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), in which one of the candidates was very closely linked to (and informally endorsed by) the PAN leadership. The results show the levels of support for this candidate were higher in places with PAN officeholders. Additional evidence suggests this pattern is driven by PAN officeholders (1) investing resources into electoral mobilization and (2) tampering with the lists of registered voters. ​

​Ascencio, Sergio J. and Yann P. Kerevel. 2021. "Party Strategy, Candidate Selection, and Legislative Behavior in Mexico." Legislative Studies Quarterly 46(3): 713-743. 
[Pre-print]

What explains party unity in legislatures? Prior research suggests when candidate selection and electoral rules create incentives for legislators to cultivate a personal vote, party unity should decline. However, previous theories often treat candidate selection rules as exogenous institutions that have independent effects on legislative behavior despite the fact the choice of nomination rules are often an intraparty issue and a key component of partisan electoral strategies. Here, we develop a theory linking candidate selection rules to party unity through the strategic behavior of party leaders. Our main finding is that, under personalized electoral rules, the effects of nomination rules on legislative behavior are conditional on parties' electoral incentives. We test our theory using data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, a case where our results are unlikely to be explained by personal vote‐seeking incentives since legislators are banned from seeking reelection.

​​Ascencio, Sergio J. and Miguel R. Rueda. 2019. "Partisan Poll Watchers and Electoral Manipulation." American Political Science Review 113(3): 727-742.
​[Pre-print]

​How do parties protect themselves from electoral manipulation? To answer this question, we study the drivers of polling station party representatives’ presence and their impact on electoral outcomes in an environment where electoral irregularities are common. Using election data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, we find a robust positive correlation between the presence of party representatives and that party’s vote share. The evidence suggests that this correlation can be attributed to party representatives influencing the electoral results. We also formulate a game theoretic model of the levels of representation chosen by parties in a given precinct and structurally estimate its parameters. We find that parties send their representatives where they expect their opponents to send their own. The finding suggests representatives play a primarily protective role, even when they are often involved in irregularities themselves.

Working Papers

​​​Do Primaries Improve Evaluations of Public Officials? Experimental Evidence from Mexico  (with ​Han Il Chang)​​
​​​ Invited to revise and resubmit at ​Political Behavior​​​

Do nomination rules shape how voters evaluate their representatives? Some scholars argue that, in places where trust in political parties is low, primary elections can be an electoral asset by improving how politicians are regarded by voters. Yet, this claim has received little empirical scrutiny. A survey experiment in Mexico, where parties have employed several nomination rules in recent years, allows us to assess this argument. We find that revealing that a politician was nominated in a primary has a strong positive effect on the politician's perceived quality but does not impact respondents' likelihood of voting for them. Interestingly, disclosing that a politician was handpicked by the party leaders has a limited impact on perceptions of their quality but makes voters significantly less willing to vote for that politician. Our results have important implications for political parties in many developing countries and new democracies, where intraparty democracy is increasingly popular.

Does Vote Buying Undermine Confidence in Ballot Secrecy? Theory and Experimental Evidence  (with ​Han Il Chang)​​
​​​ Under review

Why does vote buying persist under the secret ballot? We argue initiating vote-buying transactions allows politicians to undermine voter confidence in the secret ballot, and thus to induce voter compliance. Our analysis consists of three parts. First, we present evidence from a survey experiment in Mexico that shows receiving material goods from a candidate diminishes voter confidence in ballot integrity. Next, we introduce an informational theory of vote buying that explains this phenomenon. Specifically, we develop a model of vote buying as a signaling game, in which a voter who is ex ante uncertain about a politician's capacity to monitor voter behavior learns new information from the politician's actions. Finally, we test the key insights from the model in a lab experiment. Our results suggest that, under certain conditions, offering material goods to voters is sufficient to erode their confidence in ballot secrecy, making vote buying effective.

Do Voters (Dis)Like Dynastic Politicians? Experimental Evidence from Pakistan  (with Rabia Malik)​
​​​​​​ ​Under review​​​

While an extensive comparative politics literature focuses on the mechanisms that facilitate the emergence and persistence of political dynasties, we know little about voters’ views on them. A survey experiment in Pakistan, a country where dynasticism is common, allows us to study how voters perceive and evaluate politicians with dynastic ties. We find that dynastic politicians are perceived as lower quality and less supportive of universalistic policies than their non-dynastic peers. Additionally, respondents report a lower preference of voting for such candidates themselves, suggesting that the “dynastic electoral advantage” documented in previous research is elite-driven. Our findings suggest that voters also perceive non-dynastic candidates needing to be more qualified to overcome the higher entry barriers created by dynasticism. These results also have important implications for the quality of representation in many developing countries, where entrenched political families continue playing key roles in national and local politics.

Using Gender Quotas to Fight Intraparty Battles
​​

This paper studies the role of gender quotas as a strategy to consolidate power within political parties. I argue that party leaders can neutralize potential (male) challengers by strategically blocking their political careers through the selective use of gender quotas in their constituencies. I assess this argument in the context of the 2015 Mexican legislative election, in which a major party reserved specific single-member districts for female politicians in order to comply with the legally-mandated national quota. Using an original dataset that combines information on reserved districts with results from the party's previous internal elections, I find evidence that the decision of what districts to reserve is indeed driven, to a large extent, by intraparty competition. These findings have important implications for the literature on the adoption of party quotas, and provide a complementary answer to the puzzle of why predominantly male political elites promote the adoption of these policies. 
​[Available upon request]

​​​​​​Do Divisive Primaries Hurt Parties?  Evidence from Mexico
​​

I study the effect of primary election divisiveness on general election outcomes in Mexico. Although an extensive literature in American politics has documented evidence that divisive primary elections hurt political parties’ electoral performance, it is unclear whether these findings generalize to other settings. Using an original dataset on legislative primaries at both the federal and the state levels, I find that divisive primaries—measured as those won by a narrow margin—do not affect the party’s electoral performance. However, my results show that the party leaders’ interference in favor of a primary aspirant can exacerbate internal divisions, and even trigger party defections, significantly hurting the electoral prospects of the party’s eventual nominee. These findings have important implications for political parties in developing countries, many of which increasingly conduct primary elections but lack the resources or institutions to guarantee that all aspirants will be treated equally.
​[Available upon request]

Works in progress

Stacking the Deck: A Theory of Party Control of Primary Elections​

Using Recall Elections to Build Strong Parties: Loyalty, Competence, and Promotion

Destruction of Property and Popular Support for (Feminist) Protests in Mexico (with Gabby Rivera and Han Il Chang)

When Do Political Elites Support Power Grabs? Theory and Evidence from Bolivia (with Ximena Velasco-Guachalla)

Other papers

Endogenous Issue Salience in an Ownership Model of Elections (with Mike Gibilisco)
​
Party System Polarization: Citizen Perceptions, Manifesto Statements, and Change (with ​G. Bingham Powell, Jr.​​)