Publications
Ascencio, Sergio J. and Yann P. Kerevel. Forthcoming. "Party Strategy, Candidate Selection, and Legislative Behavior in Mexico ." Legislative Studies Quarterly.
What explains party unity in legislatures? Prior research suggests when candidate selection and electoral rules create incentives for legislators to cultivate a personal vote, party unity should decline. However, previous theories often treat candidate selection rules as exogenous institutions that have independent effects on legislative behavior despite the fact the choice of nomination rules are often an intraparty issue and a key component of partisan electoral strategies. Here, we develop a theory linking candidate selection rules to party unity through the strategic behavior of party leaders. Our main finding is that, under personalized electoral rules, the effects of nomination rules on legislative behavior are conditional on parties' electoral incentives. We test our theory using data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, a case where our results are unlikely to be explained by personal vote-seeking incentives since legislators are banned from seeking reelection.
[Available upon request]
[Available upon request]
Ascencio, Sergio J. and Miguel R. Rueda. 2019. "Partisan Poll Watchers and Electoral Manipulation." American Political Science Review 113(3): 727-742.
title 2
How do parties protect themselves from electoral manipulation? To answer this question, we study the drivers of polling station party representatives’ presence and their impact on electoral outcomes in an environment where electoral irregularities are common. Using election data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, we find a robust positive correlation between the presence of party representatives and that party’s vote share. The evidence suggests that this correlation can be attributed to party representatives influencing the electoral results. We also formulate a game theoretic model of the levels of representation chosen by parties in a given precinct and structurally estimate its parameters. We find that parties send their representatives where they expect their opponents to send their own. The finding suggests representatives play a primarily protective role, even when they are often involved in irregularities themselves.
[Download here]
[Download here]
Working Papers
Retaining Political Talent: A Candidate-Centered Theory of Primary Adoption
Why do party leaders constrain their own power and allow the use of primary elections? I develop a model of intraparty politics and electoral competition in which an ambitious officeseeker reevaluates her party affiliation after her party chooses a nomination rule. The model shows that, in settings in which the linkages between politicians and parties are weak, party leaders adopt primaries in order to keep potential defectors from pursuing their individual ambitions outside of the party. The main theoretical result shows that only parties that are electorally strong ex ante can use primaries as a strategy to hold their parties together. Thus, in contrast to an extensive literature that links the use of primaries to electorally weak parties, this model posits the existence of a positive relationship between the use of primaries and a party's electoral strength. Analysis of an original dataset on candidate selection in Mexico supports this expectation.
[Download the latest version here]
[Download the latest version here]
Nomination Selection Rules and the Calculus of Mobilization: Theory and Evidence from Mexico
Under review
Under review
Does party organization shape candidates' electoral mobilization efforts? I develop a novel theoretical account linking candidate selection rules to electoral mobilization. Nomination rules that require aspiring candidates to compete in electoral races, such as primaries, create incentives for them to make considerable investments in order to win the party's nomination. Using a decision-theoretic model, I show how these initial investments at the nomination's stage shape the candidates' mobilization expenditures in the general election. The main theoretical result establishes that primaries increase candidates' mobilization efforts only when the general election is not expected to be competitive; when a close race is expected, candidates mobilize at the same rates regardless of how they were nominated. Analysis of an original dataset on candidate selection and electoral mobilization in Mexico provides strong support for the theory.
[Available upon request]
[Available upon request]
Party Influence in Presidential Primaries: Evidence from Mexico
Invited to revise and resubmit at Party Politics
Invited to revise and resubmit at Party Politics
Over recent decades, an increasing number of presidential candidates across the world have been nominated in primary elections. Yet, our understanding of presidential primaries outside of the U.S. remains very limited. I argue that in developing democracies, where clientelistic practices are common, primary outcomes are shaped by the actions of local party elites, particularly those with the resources to mobilize primary voters. I provide support for this claim using an original dataset from the 2012 presidential primary of the Mexican Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), in which one of the candidates was very closely linked to (and informally endorsed by) the PAN leadership. The results show the levels of support for this candidate were higher in places with PAN officeholders. Additional evidence suggests this pattern is driven by PAN officeholders (1) investing resources into electoral mobilization and (2) tampering with the lists of registered voters.
[Available upon request]
[Available upon request]
Over recent decades, an increasing number of presidential candidates across the world have been nominated in primary elections. Yet, our understanding of presidential primaries outside of the U.S. remains very limited. I argue that in developing democracies, where clientelistic practices are common, primary outcomes are shaped by the actions of local party elites, particularly those with the resources to mobilize primary voters. I provide support for this claim using an original dataset from the 2012 presidential primary of the Mexican Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), in which one of the candidates was very closely linked to (and informally endorsed by) the PAN leadership. The results show the levels of support for this candidate were higher in places with PAN officeholders. Additional evidence suggests this pattern is driven by PAN officeholders (1) investing resources into electoral mobilization and (2) tampering with the lists of registered voters.
[Available upon request]
[Available upon request]
We analyze a formal model of electoral competition based on the issue-ownership theory of campaigns. In the model, parties invest resources to manipulate the salience of various issues, and the salience of an issue is the probability a voter casts her ballot according to her party preferences on that issue. That is, parties use campaigns to prime voters to think about different issues. Our results uncover Riker's ``dominance principle'' and suggest that parties will generally campaign on one issue. The two-dimensional version of the model demonstrates that parties talk past each other and indicates that competition will be most fierce when parties are similarly effective campaigners and the issues are not naturally salient. Furthermore, we show that with more than two parties, there is a potential for free-riding on the campaigns of parties who are the most effective.
[Download the latest version here]
[Download the latest version here]
Why does vote buying persist under the secret ballot? This paper argues that initiating vote buying transactions allows political parties to undermine voter confidence in the secret ballot, and thus to induce compliance with these exchanges. We support this argument in three steps. First, we present evidence from a survey experiment in Mexico that suggests being a target of vote buying can diminish a voter's trust in ballot integrity. Next, we introduce a formal model of vote buying as a signaling game, in which a voter is uncertain about a politician's capacity to monitor voter behavior at the polls. The main substantive insight of the model is that, by initiating vote buying exchanges, the politician can change voter's belief about ballot secrecy, making vote buying effective. Finally, we conduct a lab experiment, and find strong empirical support for the model's main expectations. Our findings have important implications for the design of policies to protect electoral integrity. Even when institutions make monitoring vote choices unfeasible, politicians can buy votes as long as small doubt about ballot secrecy remains in voters' minds.
Works in progress
Using Gender Quotas to Fight Intraparty Battles (with Chit Basu)
Do Divisive Primaries Hurt Parties? Evidence from Mexico
Divisive Primaries? How Polarization, Incumbency, and Term Limits Shape Intraparty Competition
Dynastic Ties, Gender Stereotypes, and Candidate Evaluations in Mexico (with Han Il Chang)
Stacking the Deck: Electoral Reform and Democratization in the Mexican States, 1979-2009
Gubernatorial Influence in Candidate Selection: Evidence from Legislative Primaries in Mexico
Party System Polarization: Citizen Perceptions, Manifesto Statements, and Change (with G. Bingham Powell, Jr.)
Do Divisive Primaries Hurt Parties? Evidence from Mexico
Divisive Primaries? How Polarization, Incumbency, and Term Limits Shape Intraparty Competition
Dynastic Ties, Gender Stereotypes, and Candidate Evaluations in Mexico (with Han Il Chang)
Stacking the Deck: Electoral Reform and Democratization in the Mexican States, 1979-2009
Gubernatorial Influence in Candidate Selection: Evidence from Legislative Primaries in Mexico
Party System Polarization: Citizen Perceptions, Manifesto Statements, and Change (with G. Bingham Powell, Jr.)